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This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptation
cost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-
term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less eﬀective than
switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent
holdup of speci￿c investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract
length therefore trades oﬀ speci￿c and adaptation investments. Length should increase
with the importance and speci￿city of self-investments, and decrease with the importance
of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineﬀective. My general model also shows
how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.
Jel Classification numbers: D23.
Keywords: Contract length; market forces; incomplete contracts; holdup.
∗I thank Erik Beulen, Ramon Campabadal, Oliver Hart, Ashok Kaul, Eric Maskin, Elisenda Monforte,
Michael Raith, Jan Sarsanedas, Andrei Shleifer, J· er￿ ome Vandenbussche, Abe Wickelgren and seminar partic-
ipants at ASSA (2005), the Toulouse IDEI Conference in Honor of Jean-Jacques Laﬀont (2005), the Harvard
Kennedy School, the Kellogg School of Management, and Autonoma de Barcelona, Northwestern, Tilburg, Tor-
cuato di Tella Universities for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge ￿nancial support from the European
Commission (HPMF-CT-1999-00317), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (BEC 2003-00412) and
CREA (Barcelona Economics). Comments gratefully received at Matthew.Ellman@upf.edu.
11 Introduction
Transactions Cost and Incomplete Contract theorists have shown how long-term contracts
help protect relationship-speci￿c investments (see Williamson, 1975 and 1985, Klein, Crawford
and Alchian, 1978, and the formalization in Grout, 1984), but we know little about the costs
of extending contract length. This paper formalizes a simple yet powerful idea: long-term
contracts may obstruct bene￿cial market forces. My conceptual contribution is to show how
and when this market-shielding cost arises. I also formalize two other major costs of contract
duration. I then represent the costs and bene￿ts of contract duration within a single theoretical
model in order to derive optimal contract length. Using the market-shielding results alone, the
paper is able to resolve three signi￿cant puzzles from the empirical literature. My framework
also throws light on the practical challenge of designing ￿exible long-term contracts.
Contracts vary greatly in length. Multi-year contracts are common in, for example, con-
struction, contract manufacturing, distribution, franchising and Information Technology (IT).
Outsourcing in IT presents an instructive showcase.1 For instance, IBM Global Services sells
IT services to Nokia, Hertz, American Express (Amex) and Deutsche-Bank (DB) under 5, 6,
7 and 10 year contracts, respectively. I will use IBM￿s $4bn deal with Amex (see Weiss, 2002)
to illustrate the main ideas of the paper. Signed in February of 2002, the contract essentially
obliges IBM to manage and maintain Amex￿s Information System (IS) at a predetermined
price. I call this exchange the ￿basic trade.￿2 The contract duration is 7 years - it enforces the
basic trade from 2002 till 2009 - but through renegotiation and renewal, Amex could have paid
IBM to provide the same services under a sequence of longer or shorter contracts. I therefore
ask: what are the costs and bene￿ts of increasing contract length?
I begin with an example of the now familiar bene￿ts. IBM invested in organization and
planning to lower its costs of managing Amex￿s Information System. Many of these invest-
ments are partly speci￿c to Amex. For instance, IBM coached 2000 workers who transferred
from Amex to IBM in 2002. This reduced IBM￿s cost of servicing Amex, but the transferred
workers￿ speci￿c knowledge of Amex does not help IBM in servicing other clients. So IBM
must sell services to Amex if it is to fully exploit its cost-reducing investment. Under short-
term contracting, Amex could therefore extract a share of the cost-reduction by refusing to
buy unless IBM lowers its price. This ￿holdup￿ by Amex reduces IBM￿s investment returns,
1The IT outsourcing market was worth over $569bn in 2003, up 6.2% from 2002 (Pruitt, 2004). US govern-
ment IT outsourcing hit $8.5bn in 2003 and is likely to exceed $15bn by 2008 (Input, 2004). The UK National
Health Service alone awarded ￿ve IT contracts in January 2004, each 10 years long and worth over $1bn.
2The contract actually speci￿es a range of prices (see section 6). It covers infrastructure (data center,
networks and desktops) and application software, but is basic relative to subsequently discovered adaptations.
2so it causes IBM to underinvest. The long-term contract serves to protect IBM￿s investment
against holdup by ￿xing the price Amex pays for the basic trade. Lengthening the contract
raises IBM￿s incentives by increasing the duration of this protection.
The long-term contract can also protect IBM-speci￿c investments by Amex. For instance,
when Amex learns to make better use of the basic IT from IBM, the contract prevents IBM
from holding up Amex by raising the trade price. In general, long-term contracts protect
speci￿c investments that raise the investor￿s own payoﬀ from the basic trade. These are called
￿self-investments￿ (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). Motivating self-investments is the key
bene￿t of long-term contracting. I now turn to my contributions which deal with the costs.
My primary contribution is to identify the market-shielding cost of contracting. Consider
what happens when Amex invests in market research and discovers a valuable IT innovation.
For instance, Amex planned a web-based expense reporting service for its corporate customers
in 2003. To exploit this innovation, Amex needed an adapted IT service with new software
and third-party web access. The long-term contract did not oblige IBM to provide the adapted
system, since it was not included in the basic trade. So Amex had to adapt its contracts to
exploit its investment, which I therefore de￿ne as an ￿adaptation investment.￿ Amex had two
choices: either negotiate a deal with IBM or pay a competitor to make the changes.
Without the long-term contract, both alternatives would have been reasonable. Amex could
have paid IBM to switch to providing the adapted service, or it could have stopped buying
from IBM and negotiated provision of the adapted service from one of IBM￿s competitors, such
as Electronic Data Systems (EDS). IBM may have sunk costs speci￿ct oA m e x ,b u ti nd e f a u l t
of trade with IBM, Amex would credibly pay EDS to sink its avoidable start-up costs. Market
forces - here Amex￿s threat of using EDS - therefore limit the price that IBM can charge for
the adaptation. This ensures that Amex can earn a reasonable return on its investment.
Unfortunately, the long-term contract shields the relationship from these market forces:
Amex was unable to credibly threaten to buy the adapted service from EDS alongside the
basic service from IBM. The adapted service would have mostly duplicated the basic service
and its additional value (given Amex￿s limited service need) did not justify EDS￿s avoidable
costs of substituting for IBM.3 As a result, Amex depended on IBM to exploit its adaptation.
IBM was therefore able to hold up Amex by charging a high price for adaptation. Anticipating
this holdup, Amex has less incentive to invest in adaptations.
Long-term contracts do not always cause holdup of adaptation investments, because side-
3Breach of the long-term contract would avoid duplication of the basic service. Breach is common after
mergers, but I follow Tirole (1990, page 54) in de￿ning long-term contracts as those with breach penalties that
enforce future performance. In 6.2, I generalize to stochastic breach.
3trading (i.e. accessing market alternatives alongside the long-term contract) is sometimes
feasible. For instance, had Amex been able to separate the adapted service into a basic service
and an adaptation service, Amex might have turned to EDS for the adaptation alone as
a side-trade complementing (instead of duplicatively substituting) the basic trade with IBM.
Amex￿s threat of buying from EDS alongside the contract with IBM would then protect Amex￿s
investment from holdup.
The eﬀectiveness of side-trading threats is highest when the adaptation and basic trades
are least related, because separating provision of the basic and adaptation tasks between
two providers (such as EDS and IBM) wastes any economies of scope. For instance, both
tasks might require the same ￿xed costs of learning about Amex. Also, separation may cause
coordination and interference problems. For instance, IBM could refuse to provide user-support
or third-party web access for software developed by EDS, or IBM could abuse its power as IT
host to study EDS￿s proprietary code (see section 6). These are precisely the settings where
practitioners warn of ￿exibility problems (see section 2).
To formalize, I de￿ne the ￿side-compatibility￿ of an adaptation investment with a long-term
contract to be the fraction of investment returns that the investor (here the buyer, Amex) can
credibly exploit through side-trading (alongside the contract). Under full side-compatibility,
the investor can threaten to turn to the market as eﬀectively during a long-term contract as
under short-term contracting. In this special case, long-term contracts do not induce holdup
of adaptation investments. More generally, the ￿market-shielding￿ cost of long-term contracts
decreases with the side-compatibility of desirable adaptation investments. So higher side-
compatibility permits traders to write longer contracts.
This simple point is central to my applications in section 6. Here, I brie￿y summarize how
the three design issues of section 6 ￿ multi-sourcing, buyer dedication, and exclusive contracting
￿ allow me to resolve the three empirical puzzles. The ￿rst issue is choosing whether to multi-
source, wherein the buyer deals with multiple vendors (sources). For instance, suppose back in
2002, Amex had split its basic needs between two vendors by contracting IBM to maintain its
servers and networks, while contracting EDS to manage its desktop environment, applications
software and help-desk.4 This would have wasted possible economies of scope by making both
EDS and IBM sink ￿xed costs in learning about Amex. The main advantage is that EDS and
IBM would then have competed for more of Amex￿s subsequent adaptations: multi-sourcing
raises side-compatibility.
This result resolves an interesting empirical puzzle. Transaction cost theory informally pre-
4Multisourcing is increasingly common in IT ￿ e.g., Procter & Gamble recently rejected a mega-contract with
EDS in favour of smaller contracts with HP, IBM and Jones, Lang & Lasalle (see 6.3); see also Singer (2004).
4dicts shorter contract durations for companies that buy from multiple vendors: the multiplicity
of active suppliers suggests high competition, so investment speci￿city and the resulting need
for long-term contracting is low. (In proposition 5 below, I formally prove that optimal contract
length is indeed increasing in speci￿city.) However, the evidence from electronics outsourcing
(L· opez and Ventura, 2001, and Gonz· alez and L· opez, 2002) suggests that multi-sourcers tend,
if anything, to use longer contracts. My theory helps to explain the puzzle: multi-sourcers can
write longer contracts, because side-compatibility is high and this lowers the market-shielding
cost of contracting.
To treat the second puzzle, I apply the concept of side-compatibility to adaptation invest-
ments by sellers (vendors). Suppose IBM develops a more secure IT service (e.g., by investing
in asynchronous chip technology - see the Economist, 2001). IBM has a huge capacity so
it could earn a market reward alongside the basic trade with Amex, by selling this adapted
service to other buyers. However, for a smaller IT company, a long-term contract may limit
side-compatibility by tying up most of the company￿s production capacity. Limited production
capacity of the seller plays a role parallel to that of the buyer￿s limited consumption need (such
as Amex￿s need for just one IT service).
Companies usually design their long-term contracts to employ only a fraction of their
capacity, but economies of scale sometimes encourage a seller to dedicate most or all of its
capacity to a single buyer. Side-compatibility is then very limited. This can resolve a second
empirical puzzle. Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001) measure how far coal companies dedicate
capacity to satisfying contracts with speci￿c clients. These scholars predicted that contract
length would correlate positively with dedication since dedication is a standard proxy for
relationship-speci￿city, but they found that the most dedicated coal companies actually tend
to write shorter contracts. The side-compatibility concept identi￿es a countervailing force that
can explain their puzzling result: dedication lowers side-compatibility, thereby raising the cost
of long-term contracting.
Bercovitz (2000) uncovered the third empirical puzzle in data on franchising. Exclusive
territories complement long-term performance contracts in protecting speci￿c investments by
franchisees, so Bercovitz (2000) predicted a positive correlation, but she found the opposite.
The side-compatibility concept can explain this puzzle: contracts should be shorter when
exclusivity is needed, because exclusivity clauses directly lower side-compatibility. To see why,
notice that if Amex had committed to buy all its IT from IBM, it could never threaten to seek
an IT adaptation from a third party.5
5Unsurprisingly, IT contracts often actively oppose exclusivity. E.g., M&I￿s contract with Tri City obliges
M&I to cooperate with third-party providers, and GM￿s 10-year $32bn contract with EDS includes a ￿right to
5To increase the relevance of my model, I generalize it in section 4 to capture two other
major costs of long-term contracting. First, long-term contracts reduce incentives to make in-
vestments with positive contractual externalities. For instance, when IBM investments improve
storage eﬃciency, Amex bene￿ts since the pay-as-you-use formula in the long-term contract
with IBM ￿xes a price per unit of server space used. Unlike IBM￿s cost-cutting self-investment
that raises IBM￿s own payoﬀ, this is a ￿cross-investment￿6 by IBM because it bene￿ts Amex
(the other party). The long-term contract reduces IBM￿s incentive to improve storage eﬃciency,
because it prevents Amex from punishing low eﬃciency with a termination threat (see Hoﬀ-
man, 2002, for evidence of this incentive cost). Second, long-term contracting can encourage
wasteful self-investments. For instance, IBM might waste resources trying to hide low quality
aspects of its service or litigating Amex (see CORI on EDS-Xerox, 1994). Similarly, long-term
contracts can cause over-investment when a self-investment has negative cross-investment ef-
fects (e.g., lowering quality). My model shows that short-term contracting avoids all these
problems, but introduces parallel problems for investments with ￿cross-general￿ eﬀects (i.e.,
eﬀects on other party￿s market payoﬀs).
The secondary contribution of this paper is to formulate a generic model of trade be-
tween two parties with multiple investments. My ￿rst set of results characterizes how diﬀerent
investments respond to changes in contract length. I classify investments into two types.
Self-investments and cross-general investments are type 1 (contract-ophilic). They rise with
contract length. Adaptation investments with limited side-compatibility and cross-investments
are type 2 (contract-ophobic). They fall with contract length. I then use these results to deter-
mine how contract length optimally trades oﬀ investments based on their relative desirability.
My second set of results can be summarized as: optimal contract length increases with (1) the
desirability of type 1 relative to type 2 investments; (2) the relationship-speci￿city of type 1
investments; and (3) the side-compatibility of type 2 investments.
The rich literature on contract design in microeconomics (see Holmstr¤ om and Milgrom,
1991, or Salani· e, 1997) tends to ignore a key factor: discoveries are made over time. I follow the
￿incomplete contracting approach￿ (see Hart, 1995) in emphasizing unanticipated discoveries,
but my results do not require shifts in the residual rights of control.7 My focus on the time
dimension of contracting complements the literatures on damage measures (see Rogerson,
1984, and Shavell, 1984) and variable quantity contracts (see Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). In
solicit bids￿ (CORI).
6Che and Hausch (1999) call it ￿cooperative investment￿ but see Ellman (1999 and 2006) or Watson (2003).
7I isolate the role of contractual obligations to trade (c.f., Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, where long-term
contracting is tied to privatization of ownership).
6section 4, I use Hart et al.￿s (1997) over-investment insight and Che and Hausch￿s (1999) model
of how long-term contracts harm cross-investments. Farrell and Shapiro (1989), MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) and Guriev and Kvassov (2006) oﬀer complementary studies of contracting
over multiple trading periods. None of these papers capture the market-shielding problem
because they do not allow for adaptation investments.8
The literature on transaction costs (see Williamson, 1985) presents vital insights. Joskow￿s
(1987) empirical support for the idea that contract length should increase with relationship-
speci￿city (as proxied by limited competitive alternatives) has become a classic, and has been
con￿rmed in several industries (see Masten and Saussier, 2002). My propositions 4 and 5
formalize this idea. Furthermore, because uncertainty and complexity raise the importance of
ongoing adaptations (and raise the risk that contracts motivate undesirable investments), my
theory explains the growing evidence that these factors lead to shorter contracts.9 Finally, my
analysis re￿nes the transaction cost idea that long-term contracts can cause in￿exibility, and
suggests an explanation of ex post adaptation failure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 solves it for
optimal contract length. Section 4 introduces cross eﬀects and wasteful investments. Section
5 extends the number of trading periods. Section 6 endogenizes side-compatibility through
empirically motivated features of contract design, and applies the theoretical results to explain
the empirical puzzles. Section 7 concludes.
2B a s i c M o d e l
This section introduces a simple model to analyze how advance commitment to an (imperfect)
formal contract aﬀects the eﬃciency of a bilateral relationship embedded within a market. I
denote the central actors by P for principal and A for agent; buyer-seller interpretations are
also valid and I refer to all interactions as trades. Until section 5, I adopt a simpli￿ed timing:
when P and A meet in stage 0 (February 2002 in Amex and IBM￿s case), they can negotiate
an initial contract to govern stage 3 trade. In stage 1, P and A invest to raise trade surplus.
In stage 2, after observing their trade values, they ￿nalize the contracts that will govern their
joint and market trading in stage 3.
Contracting. Advance contracting is restricted by P and A￿s bounded ability to think up
ways to enforce future trades. In stage 0, P and A can only choose between writing a ￿basic￿
8MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) do include a general investment, but it is also protected by the long-term
contract so there is no market-shielding problem.
9See Crocker and Masten (1988), Brickley et al (2003), Gonz· alez and L· opez (2002) who respectively use price
uncertainty, inexperience and subjective inexperience as proxies.
7performance contract, X, and writing a ￿null￿ contract, Φ (that does not enforce any stage 3
trade10). During stage 1, they learn better ways to trade, so that by stage 2, they can choose a
contract from the set {Φ,X,Z} where Z is the ￿adapted￿ contract that generates the highest
surplus. Contracting is long-term w h e nPa n dAc o m m i ta ts t a g e0t oap e r f o r m a n c ec o n t r a c t
(X) before investing. Contracting is short-term when instead they initially select the null
contract Φ, leaving trade negotiation to the last minute (here, stage 2). (In the multi-period
generalization in section 5, contract length is the amount of time over which the initial contract
enforces basic trade performance.)
Payoﬀs. Pa n dA ￿ sp a y o ﬀs depend on their investments and on stage 3 trade contracts.
A typical investment, ej ∈ I R+ by j ∈ {P,A}, imposes a private cost of ej on the investing
party j and increases P and A￿s optimized stage 3 trade surplus (the surplus under Z)b y
Wj (ej). However, in default of renegotiation between P and A, ej only raises j￿s payoﬀ under
Φ by γejWj (ej), and only raises j￿s payoﬀ under X by ψejWj (ej). In the default under Φ,
there is no performance contract between P and A, so γej represents j￿s fractional return on
ej after j switches to j￿s best alternative (market) trade. In the case of a speci￿c investment,
γej < 1b e c a u s ej￿s investment is then more eﬀective in joint trading. Since γej =0f o ra
fully speci￿c investment and γej = 1 for a fully general investment, I call γej the generality of
ej. Meanwhile, in the default under X, j engages in the basic trade with −j (−j denotes A
if j = P and P if j = A) and a side-trading response to X.S o ψej represents j￿s fractional
return on ej from both the basic trade induced by long-term contracting on X and the optimal
side-trade; ψej eﬀectively sums ej￿s self-investment eﬀect (direct compatibility with contract
X)a n dej￿s side-compatibility (see introduction and de￿nition below).
Existing work assumes that ψej ≥ γej.T h i sr e ￿ects how the long-term contract (X)m a y
guarantee j a better investment return than aﬀorded by market trading - ψej then re￿ects how
well the contract X directly protects the investment.11 H o w e v e r ,t h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,ψej <γ ej,
is also feasible. This occurs when the long-term contract X interferes with market access.
Consider an ￿adaptation investment,￿ ej,d e ￿ned as one needing an adapted contract (such as
Z). By this de￿nition, ej generates no direct bene￿ts under X, but in default of renegotiation
with −j, j might still negotiate an adapted contract in the market. Accessing the market is
usually more eﬀective under Φ than under X, because enforcement of X tends to deplete j￿s
capacity for market trading. As a result, the default returns on most adaptation investments
10P and A may trade in stage 1, but I leave implicit the contract that enforces this trade.
11This self-investment case occurs when a speci￿c investment, ej, is directly compatible with X by reducing
j￿s cost of satisfying X (e.g., IBM coaching) and/or raising j￿s bene￿tf r o mX (e.g., Amex learning to coordinate
with IBM).
8are greater under Φ (through switching trade partner) than under X (through side-trading).
For an adaptation investment, ψej represents the fractional returns on ej available through
side-trading, so ψej measures its ￿side-compatibility￿. Since the case with ψej <γ ej is central
to my paper, I now provide an explicit demonstration of how contract X interferes with access
to the market alternatives that could provide the needed adaptations. (This can be skipped
at a ￿rst reading.)
Derivation of side-compatibility and generality. I treat in turn adaptations by a
buyer and then adaptations by a seller, emphasizing how depleted trade capacity interferes
with adaptations. When j is the buyer, j￿s direct payoﬀ under X equals j￿s value of the basic
service (or good) less the transfer to seller −j imposed by contract X in stage 3. I denote this
payoﬀ by v and normalize j￿s direct payoﬀ under Φ to 0.I fj and −j negotiate the adapted
contract Z, their joint surplus is v+Wj (ej)+W−j (e−j)−F1. In default of this renegotiation,
j must turn to an alternative seller such as −j0.
When (under Φ) j switches to trade with −j0, −j0 can provide the adapted trade to j using
a technology which I denote by T1. In contrast to −j, −j0 has not sunk any investments speci￿c
to j, so technology T1 involves additional ￿xed costs F1 and may involve higher marginal costs
of adaptation (relative to the technology used by −j). So I assume j￿s value from this trade
takes the form, v +γ1Wj (ej) − F1 for some γ1 ∈ (0,1].12 I assume v>F 1 ￿ the basic service
is important enough to j to justify the avoidable ￿xed cost F1. So, absent renegotiation under
Φ, it is optimal (for all ej)f o rj to switch to buying the adapted trade from −j0 through T1.
Hence γej = γ1 > 0.
When side-trading (under X), j￿s value from trade with technology T1 is only γ1Wj (ej)−F1,
because j already has the basic service supplied by −j under X and j only has a demand for
one basic service. (More generally, j￿s demand for the basic trade is limited, so trade under
X depletes j￿s capacity for trade.) Assuming γ1Wj (ej) <F 1 for all ej (I generalize in the
stochastic case below), it is never optimal to side-trade when T1 is the only feasible technology.
So ψej =0<γ ej.
Sometimes, the adapted trade can be separated into the basic trade (enforced by X)a n d
a complementary adaptation. In other words, −j0 c a np r o v i d ea na d a p t a t i o ns e r v i c eu s i n ga n
alternative, cheaper technology T2 with ￿xed cost F2 <F 1. When the adaptation service is
related to the basic service, there are economies of scope in having the same provider for both.13
12(1 − γ1)Wj (ej) represents the increase in implementation costs; see Section 4 on the possibility of γ1 > 1.
13Note that agency problems can generate economies of scope: e.g., ψej is reduced if −j is able to interfere
with −j
0￿s activities under side-trading. Contractual terms that attempt to force −j to cooperate with other
providers are notoriously hard to enforce (see Lacity and Willcocks, 1998).
9So T2 is less eﬃcient: it generates a value γ2Wj (ej) − F2 with γ2 <γ 1 and F2 >v− F1. T1
therefore remains optimal when j switches supplier, but assuming F1 −F2 > (γ1 − γ2)Wj (ej)
for all ej, T2￿s lower ￿xed cost is attractive when j engages in side-trading. In default of
renegotiation, j and −j0 would use T1 under Φ and T2 under X.S o γej = γ1 (as before)
and ψej rises to γ2. So separability raises ψej but ψej remains below γej,b e c a u s ej￿s limited
demand dissuades j from exploiting economies of scope (via technology T1) when side-trading.
The result that γej >ψ ej for adaptation investments is common to many generalizations
of the trading technology, but the size of the diﬀerence γej − ψej depends on contractual and
organizational design (as well as technological separability and economies of scope). Endo-
geneity of γej − ψej is important for the empirics of section 6. First, even when separation
is technologically feasible, ψej can be reduced to 0 by contractual terms, such as exclusivity
restrictions included in X,t h a td i r e c t l yp r e v e n tj from buying services from alternative sell-
ers. Second, consider organization j￿s choice between buying from one or multiple sellers. If
j divides provision of the basic trade between −j and −j0 in stage 0 (e.g., through a pair of
long-term contracts) then both −j and −j0 must sink ￿xed costs speci￿ct oj of F0 and F0
0,
respectively. This wastes the scope economy F0
0 from using a single supplier and the gains
from task specialization between the suppliers may be low. On the other hand, when j makes
adaptation investments, each of the two original suppliers has access to economies of scope in
providing the adaptation. So the suppliers compete to provide j￿s adaptations. This raises
the buyer￿s side-compatibility ψej. (See 6.3 and 6.5 for further analysis endogenizing these
contract design and sourcing choices.)
Practitioners have long sought to predict where long-term contracting is likely to inhibit
adaptation. It is therefore encouraging to ￿nd a direct link between my characterization and
their practical advice. Practitioners distinguish adaptations that are ￿substitute￿ trades from
those that require ￿related or unrelated, additional￿ trades. Their substitutes case corresponds
to my case of non-separability (T2 is infeasible or does not exist) in which ψej is usually
zero. Their additional trades case corresponds to the case of separability. Also, the more
the additional trade is related to the basic trade, the greater are the economies of scope
in having the same provider for both. So ψej is greater in these cases. By showing that
contractual ￿exibility increases with side-compatibility ψej, my theory provides a foundation for
the practitioner claims that contractual ￿exibility is lowest for adaptations requiring substitute
trade and highest for adaptations that are additional and unrelated.
The case of adaptations by a seller is very similar to adaptations by a buyer: limited
capacity for service production replaces limited service need as the constraint on side-trading.
An exact parallel to the above buyer examples is feasible, but I treat the more common case
10where sellers can sell multiple basic or adapted trades. So when an adaptation is discovered,
the seller wants to convert all its basic trades into adapted trades. If the seller j￿s long-
term contracts demand a fraction d of capacity and if adapted and basic services are equally
demanding on trade capacity,14 then side-trading only permits j to exploit a fraction 1 − d of
the feasible adaptation return. Hence, ψej =1−d, whereas short-term contracting ￿ equivalent
to d =0￿g i v e sγej =1>ψ ej. I endogenize the capacity dedication choice, d,i nt h es e c o n d
empirical puzzle of section 6 (6.4).
Investment returns are often stochastic. Suppose T1 is the only feasible technology and the
adaptation value is Wj (ej)+y where y is a random variable. The expected default return on ej
under Φ is then Wj (ej)Pr(v + Wj (ej)+y − F1 > 0) while the default return from side-trading
under X is Wj (ej)Pr(Wj (ej)+y−F1 > 0). Clearly γej =P r ( v+Wj (ej)+y−F1 > 0) is still
greater than ψej =P r ( Wj (ej)+y − F1 > 0).W h e ny can be large (e.g., if the buyer acquires
another ￿rm; see Lacity and Willcocks, 1998), both γej and ψej m a yb es t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi n
ej. This complicates the mathematics in optimizing contract length, but reiterates the paper￿s
basic insight: contracts have a market-shielding eﬀect that reduces adaptation incentives.
Investment categories. I categorize investments into two groups. An investment ej is
type 1 (or contract-ophilic) if ψej >γ ej and is type 2 (or contract-ophobic) if ψej <γ ej.
(See section 4 for an extension.) This categorization generalizes the introductory distinction
between investments for which the contract￿s protection eﬀect dominates, or (respectively) is
dominated by, its market-shielding eﬀects. A self-investment (e.g., IBM￿s speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t
in cost-cutting that is protected by contract X) is a typical type 1 investment. An adaptation
investment that is general but has limited side-compatibility (e.g., Amex￿s market research) is
a typical type 2 investment.
In the model, each investor makes one investment of each type. (It is straightforward to
generalize to any number of investments.) I denote j￿s type 1 and type 2 investments by ej and
ij, respectively. These investments generate additively separable returns Wj (ej)a n dVj (ij)
which I assume satisfy the standard concavity, monotonicity and Inada boundary conditions
(guaranteeing interior investment choices).
Assumption 1. For j ∈ {P,A},
W
0
j (ej) > 0,W
00
j (ej) < 0,o nej ≥ 0,a n dlimej→0+ W
0





j (ij) > 0,V
00
j (ij) < 0,o nij ≥ 0,a n dlimij→0+ V
0
j (ij)=∞, limij→∞ V
0
j (ij)=0 .
14Adaptation might need additional capacity, e.g., j might have just enough capacity to sell the basic service
and one adaptation service. Then j c a ns e l la na d a p t a t i o ns e r v i c et o−j
0 alongside selling the basic service to
−j, but this forfeits the economies of scope. So ψej > 0 but remains less than γej.
11For sections 2 and 3 only, I also restrict the parameters γ and ψ to the unit interval, [0,1].
Assumption 2. For each investment, γ,ψ lie in [0,1].
I nt h eb a s ec a s e ,a l lp a y o ﬀs are additively separable in costs, bene￿ts and transfers across
time. P and A are risk-neutral15 and face no wealth constraints. Investment costs and trade
payoﬀs are in money metric units and I normalize to the case with no time-discounting. So P
and A￿s overall objectives are given by the utility functions, Uj ≡ uj − ej − ij + Tj where uj
denotes the stage 3 trade payoﬀsa n dTj is the net additional transfer from −j to j,16
uj ≡

   
   
γej • Wj (ej)+γij • Vj (ij), if φ,φ0
ψej • Wj (ej)+ψij • Vj (ij), if x,x0
Wj (ej)+Vj (ij), under optimal trading
Renegotiation. P and A always have symmetric information and I assume that stage 3
renegotiation leads to a ￿xed and equal split of any negotiation surplus over the default outcome
determined by P and A￿s stage 0 contract; see section 4 for a generalization. I sketch the timing
for this section in Figure 1.
 
Stage 0                   Stage 1                    Stage 2                  Stage 3  
     |                |           |           |      
Negotiate                        Invest                  (Re)negotiate                         Trade     
  X or Φ           eP , iP, and eA, iA                   Z, X or Φ  
                                                                                    & market trades 
 
Figure 1: Timeline for Base Model 
 
 
The ￿rst-best. In the ￿rst-best, P and A can ￿x e and i cooperatively at stage 0. In
stage 3, the trade surplus is uP + uA =
P
j=P,A(Wj (ej)+Vj (ij)). So in stage 0, they choose




[Wj (ej)+Vj (ij) − (ej + ij)]
Assumption 1 ensures that the ￿rst order conditions are both necessary and suﬃcient, and
15I follow Goldberg and Erickson (1987) in ignoring risk. Recent evidence suggests risk-sharing often plays a
limited role in contract design even in the classic case of small farmers (see Allen and Lueck, 1995, 1999).
16All statements hold ￿for j = P,A.￿
17TP and TA (summing to 0) depend on relative bargaining power and participation constraints.














− 1=0 ( 1 )
In the second-best equilibrium, P and A choose e and i non-cooperatively, because these
investments, their costs, and their resulting payoﬀs u,a r eall non-veri￿able (e.g., outsiders
cannot measure the quality or cost of IBM￿s coaching investments). I therefore compare the
Subgame Perfect Equilibria from alternative feasible stage 0 contracts to derive the optimal
contract. I begin (in 2.1 and 2.2) with the two extreme contracts where P and A choose
either X or Φ at stage 0. Superscripts LTC and STC indicate the equilibrium values from
long-term contracting (choosing X at stage 0) and short-term contracting (choosing Φ at stage
0), respectively. I then treat the general case in 2.3; those familiar with incomplete contract
theory can jump straight to 2.3.
2.1 Equilibrium with long-term contracting
When P and A agree on X at stage 0, their default payoﬀs in stage 2 renegotiation are given by












P and A each get their default payoﬀs plus half of these renegotiation gains, so after making












Vj (ij)+K (e−j,i −j)











.Is o l v ef o rt h eS u b g a m eP e r f e c t
Equilibrium using backward induction. Party j invests to maximize this expected return less















Vj (ij) − (ej + ij)
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j (ij) − 1=0
13When ψ = 1, these conditions replicate equation (1) and give the ￿rst-best, but for ψ<1,
the concavity of W and V implies underinvestment. Investor j￿s investments increase with
j￿s share of default returns, which increase with the compatibility parameters, ψej and ψij;
long-term contracting protects investments to the extent that they are directly compatible or
side-compatible with the contract. The general intuition is familiar: a higher investment return
in the default outcome reduces dependence on negotiating with the speci￿c trading partner.
The investor therefore loses a smaller share of investment returns in renegotiation, and better
internalizes the investment.
Proposition 1. eLTC
j rises with ψej and iLTC
j rises with ψij. Assumption 2 implies





j with equality only when ψej =1 .
2.2 Equilibrium with short-term contracting
When P and A choose Φ at stage 0, their stage 2 default payoﬀs are given by the expression,















j (ij) − 1=0
Investments now increase with γ instead of ψ, and there is underinvestment when γ<1.
Proposition 2. eSTC
j rises with γej and iSTC
j rises with γij. Assumption 2 implies





j with equality only when γij =1 .
In words, short-term contracting allows market forces to motivate investments to the extent
that they are general, but (by the classic holdup problem) speci￿city causes underinvestment.18
2.3 Equilibrium with intermediate contract length
I nS e c t i o n5 ,c o n t r a c t sc a ne x t e n do v e rm u l t i p l et r a d i n gp e r i o d s ,b u te v e ni nt h eb a s i cm o d e l ,
I can treat contract length as a continuous variable by allowing for stochastic enforcement. I
18The intuition again follows from asking whether an investor can appropriate investment returns without
having to renegotiate. Under short-term contracting, the default returns are determined by the investor￿s market
alternatives re￿ected in γ. The problem is that market forces do not motivate speci￿c investments.
14let α denote the probability that X is enforced (in default of renegotiation). With converse
probability 1 − α, P and A￿s default contract is Φ. I assume that P and A can choose any
α ∈ [0,1] at stage 0 - for instance, by varying contractual ambiguity19 or breach damages (see
6.2). This generalizes the above analysis because α = 0 corresponds to short-term contracting
(STC)a n dα = 1 corresponds to long-term contracting (LTC). I refer to α as contract length
- the contract enforces trade for on average α•G time units where G, the time elapsing between
stages 0 and 3, is the common gestation period of the investments. The interpretation of α as
a deterministic contract length is validated in the multi-period model of section 5.
The default payoﬀs are now convex combinations of those from X and Φ with weights, α











1+α • ψij +( 1− α)γij
·
V 0
j (ij)=1 ( 2 )
This set of equations allows me to generalize the ￿rst two propositions and show how contract
length aﬀects investment incentives as a function of the sign and size of ψ−γ.R a i s i n gα shifts
weight from γ onto ψ. This raises H ≡ 1+α • ψ +( 1− α)γ when ψ>γ ,a n dl o w e r si tw h e n
ψ<γ . Equations (2) then imply that increasing α increases W0
j (ej) and decreases V 0
j (ij), so
ej rises and ij falls (as W and V are concave).





dα < 0. (b) Each investment rises
with γ (strictly if α<1)a n dw i t hψ (strictly if α>0). (c) With Assumption 2,
underinvestment is the only possible ineﬃciency.
eSTC
j <e j (α) <e LTC
j ≤ e∗
j and iLTC
j <i j (α) <i STC
j ≤ i∗
j for all α ∈ (0,1)
This captures the key tradeoﬀ between increasing contract length to protect type 1 investments
and reducing contract length so that market forces can better motivate type 2 investments.
Type 1 investments, eP and eA, are speci￿c but contract-compatible (γ<ψ )s ot h ec o n t r a c t
protects them better than do market forces. Type 2 investments, iP and iA,a r eg e n e r a l
and contract-incompatible (γ>ψ ) so for them, market forces are better than the long-term
contract (with its side-compatible market forces). In the next section, I predict contract length
by trading oﬀ contractual protection of e against its cost in shielding out contract-incompatible
market forces that reward i.
19Ic a nr e d e ￿ne α to be P and A￿s prior estimate of whether stage 3 trade will be induced.
153 Optimal Contract Length in the Basic Model
P and A choose contract length at stage 0. In this section, I show how optimal length is
determined by the relative importance of diﬀerent investments and the eﬀectiveness and com-
patibility of contracts and market forces. In stage 0 negotiations, P and A can use up-front
transfers to share any gains from a surplus increasing contract. So they choose α to maximize
their total surplus, subject (unlike in the ￿rst-best) to the ￿incentive compatibility￿ conditions






(Wj (ej (α)) + Vj (ij (α)) − (ej (α)+ij (α))) (3)
Propositions 1-3 show that underinvestment is the only eﬃciency problem in the basic
model. Proposition 3 also shows how to motivate more investment: increase α to improve type
1i n v e s t m e n t s ,e, and decrease α to improve type 2 investments, i. Intuition therefore suggests
that α should increase with the importance of eP and eA relative to iP and iA.T oi n v e s t i g a t e
formally, I scale up the payoﬀ impact of investments ej, ij by the importance parameters, Ej,
Ij > 0 - i.e., I replace ej and Wj (ej)b yEjej and Ej • Wj (ej)a n dIr e p l a c eij and Vj (ij)b y
Ijij and Ij • Vj (ij). Notice that this rescaling does not change the ￿rst-order conditions for
e and i, but it does change the importance of having e and i close to their ￿rst-best levels
(because the surplus loss from underinvestment is increasing in E and I, respectively). The





[EjWj (ej (α)) + IjVj (ij (α)) − (Ejej (α)+Ijij (α))] (4a)
Proposition 4a. Assuming the maximand of (4a) is concave (see appendix for
suﬃcient conditions), the optimal contract length increases with the importance
of investments of type 1, and decreases with importance of type 2￿s: α(E,I) has
∂α
∂Ej > 0 and ∂α
∂Ij < 0.
This result is consistent with empirical evidence (see e.g., Brickley et al., 2003) on the
positive correlation between contract length and the importance of non-contractible speci￿c
investments, EA. Empiricists use the size of contractible speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t sa sap r o x yf o r
the importance of non-contractible speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t s( EA). This proxy is imperfect but
reasonable, because the two types of investment are strongly complementary. For instance,
when IT outsourcing deals involve a signi￿cant (contractible) transfer of workers and assets
from client to vendor, the complementary investments in retraining and reorganization are
16largely speci￿ca n dnon-contractible (as in the above IBM example). Furthermore, if the return
on training per worker is independent of the transfer size (number of workers transferred), the
total training investment and its return can be written as Eeand E•W (e); the rescaling exercise
then exactly captures variation in transfer size. Using transfer size as a proxy, proposition 4
readily explains why almost all the longer IT contracts (those over 5 years long) occur in these
￿merger and acquisition￿ type deals.
An alternative comparative static exercise is to vary the productivity of an investment, so
that ej generates a return ￿ Ej•Wj (ej) and similarly for ij with productivity parameter ￿ Ij.T h i s















￿ Ij • V 0
j (ij)=1 ( 5 )
where H (α;ψ,γ) ≡ (1 + α • ψ +( 1− α)γ)





































solve incentive compatibility conditions (5). Notice that the
productivity parameters raise incentives to invest for ￿xed α (i.e.,
∂ej(α, ￿ Ej)
∂ ￿ Ej ,
∂ij(α,￿ Ij)
∂￿ Ij > 0).
This eﬀect countervails against the need to use α to further raise incentives (to exploit the
productivity as in the intuition), so a clear result in this case requires a regularity condition
















Proposition 4b. Under assumption 3 (and the regularity condition of Proposition
4a), the optimal contract length increases with the productivity of investments of





∂ ￿ Ej > 0
and ∂α
∂￿ Ij < 0.
The eﬀectiveness of markets and contracts (captured by γ and ψ)a l s oa ﬀects optimal
contract length. There are two types of eﬀect for any given investment. First, if ψ and
20There is no precautionary saving interpretation here, but consider the sharp countervailing eﬀect of a ￿xed
cost self-investment: when the investment￿s importance generates incentives exceeding the ￿xed cost, α can be
decreased. Assumptions 1 and 3 rule out generalized versions of this problem.
17γ change so that δ ≡ ψ − γ rises while H (α;ψ,γ) ≡ 1+α • ψ +( 1− α)γ is ￿xed, long-
term contracting becomes more eﬀective relative to the market forces freed by short-term
contracting. This intuitively favors the use of longer contracts and should increase α.I c a l l
this a substitution eﬀect, because P and A substitute market forces for contract length according
to their relative eﬀectiveness as investment motivators. Second, an increase in γ or ψ directly
raises the investment level for any given α.T h i slevel eﬀect is determined by changes in H (α)
for ￿xed α and δ.T h el e v e le ﬀect reduces the need to adjust α in favour of the investment, so
the level eﬀect on α is negative for type 1 investments and positive for type 2 investments.
Proposition 5. (Assume the regularity condition of Proposition 4a.) Contract
length rises when type 1 investments become more speci￿c( γ falls) and falls when
type 2 investments become less contract-compatible (ψ falls). In general: Changes
that increase δ = ψ − γ have a positive ￿substitution eﬀect:￿
∂α(γ,ψ)
∂δ |H= ￿ H > 0;
Changes that increase H (α;ψ,γ) have a ￿level￿ eﬀect that is negative for type 1,





I use two direct corollaries in section 6. First, contract length rises with ψ for type 2 in-
vestments, so raising side-compatibility of an adaptation investment raises optimal contract
length.21 Given that side-compatibility tends to be higher in multi-sourcing, this generates a
tendency for longer contracts in multi-vendor situations. Second, contract length rises when
market alternatives fall, because this makes investments more speci￿c, i.e., γ falls. This claim,
famously supported by Joskow (1987) and others, is clearly valid for type 1 investments. My
model shows that there is a complication, because the level eﬀect when type 2 investments
become more speci￿c could motivate shorter contracts. However, the substitution eﬀects are
positive for all investments, so this eﬀect will only dominate in special cases. Furthermore,
some investments could switch from type 2 to type 1, raising the relative importance of type
1 investments and inducing longer contracts by proposition 4.
4C r o s s E ﬀects, Waste and Bargaining Asymmetry
This section extends the model to allow for investment externalities, wasteful investment and
bargaining asymmetries. A cross eﬀect is an investment externality that occurs under the
basic contract X: the basic contract induces a (non-contractible) quality of trade that depends
on prior investment by the trading partner.22 Cross eﬀects may be negative. For instance,
21This generalizes to both investment types if level eﬀects are limited (as when α =0 ) .
22Recall the introductory example where IBM￿s storage eﬃciency raises Amex￿s trade value under their pay-
as-you-use contract. A ￿xed price contract prevents this cross eﬀect, but then Amex￿s server needs have a
18IBM might develop a way to cut its cost (of satisfying the basic contract) at some expense to
quality (as occurs under privatization in Hart et al., 1997). I de￿ne a cross-general eﬀect as an
investment externality occurring under Φ. This occurs when one party￿s investment improves
the other party￿s market alternatives under Φ. For instance, Amex might learn technical or
marketing knowledge from watching IBM invest in their joint trade.23 To complete the picture,
I allow for negative cross-general eﬀects where an investment harms the trade partner￿s market
reputation.
IBM￿s private return on a negative cross-investment exceeds the social return, so I allow for
ψ>1. This case also occurs for speci￿c investments if separate trading is sometimes optimal.
Similarly, γ>1 when investments (e.g., in advertising or search) generate alternatives that
are mostly used as threat points. To allow for pure threat point investments, I even consider
investments that are entirely wasteful in that their social return is zero. (Such threats - e.g.
to exploit a contractual loophole - are never implemented in equilibrium.)
To extend the model, I now allow j￿s investment, ej to raise −j￿s payoﬀ by ψcross
ej •Wj (ej)
under X (the cross eﬀect), and by γcross
ej • Wj (ej)u n d e rΦ (the cross-general eﬀect). I also
allow ej to be a wasteful investment by removing the additive Wj (ej)t e r mf r o mt h et r a d e
surplus under Z.24 Similarly, for ij. The impact of j￿s positive cross eﬀects is to reduce j￿s
payoﬀ from renegotiation, because −j￿s default payoﬀ is increased. The ￿rst order conditions
(5) are unchanged except that (a) ψ and γ are replaced by ﬂ ψ ≡ ψ −ψcross and ﬂ γ ≡ γ −γcross,
and (b) in the case of wasteful investments, H (α;ψ,γ)=1+α • ψ +( 1− α)γ is replaced by
H
¡
α; ﬂ ψ,ﬂ γ
¢
− 1=α • ﬂ ψ +( 1− α)ﬂ γ.
The implications of the cross eﬀects are immediate corollaries of propositions 1 to 5 because
all these results continue to hold after substituting ﬂ ψ and ﬂ γ in place of ψ and γ (see below on the
case where ﬂ ψ or ﬂ γ/ ∈ [0,1]). The cross eﬀects simply countervail against the corresponding self
eﬀects. In particular, an investment increases with contract length if and only if ψ − ψcross >
γ −γcross. So the natural extension of the type 1 investment is de￿ned by ﬂ δ ≡ ﬂ ψ−ﬂ γ>0w h i l e
type 2 investments are de￿ned by ﬂ δ<0.
A pure cross-investment is one for which ψcross > 0, while the other parameters are zero.
This is a type 2 investment because ﬂ δ = −ψcross < 0. So cross-investments fall with contract
length α even though there cannot be any market-shielding if γ = 0. Instead, the long-
term contract is costly (as in Che and Hausch, 1999), because it increases the investment￿s
cross-eﬀect on IBM (see also 6.1).
23Similarly, suppliers may learn from their buyers. E.g., Solectron learned how to make own-brand products
after working for IBM, HP and Mitsubishi (see Arru￿ nada and Vazquez, 2004, and Lee and Hoyt, 2001).
24If ej actually reduces this social return, the eﬀects are simply more pronounced.
19externality and therefore lowers the investor￿s incentive. A corollary of the extended version
of proposition 4 is that contracts should become shorter as cross-investments become more
important.25
A pure cross-general investment is one for which only γcross > 0. This is a type 1 invest-
ment since ﬂ δ = γcross > 0, so it rises with α. The contract helps because it shields out the
market externality. The extension of proposition 4 predicts longer contracts when cross-general
eﬀects are important. A contract imposing exclusivity alone may (if legal) be more eﬀective
in preventing cross-general externalities (see Segal and Whinston, 2000), but performance
contracting is often preferable since this also motivates self-investments and side-compatible
adaptations.
Asymmetries in bargaining do not change the nature of these eﬀects, but they do change the
relative importance of cross and self eﬀects, because self eﬀects lead to a bene￿t without need
for bargaining power, while cross eﬀects only matter through traders￿ renegotiation shares. If
j now wins a share θj ∈ [0,1] of the renegotiation returns, j￿s incentive conditions are as in (5)
except that (a) ﬂ ψ and ﬂ γ replaced by ψ(θ) ≡ (1 − θ)ψ −θψcross and γ (θ) ≡ (1 − θ)γ −θγcross
and (b) H (α;ψ,γ)i sr e p l a c e db yH (α;ψ,γ,θ) ≡ [2θ + α • ψ(θ)+( 1− α)γ (θ)]. Again the
results extend in straightforward fashion. An investment is now type 1 if δ(θ) > 0w h e r e
δ(θ) ≡ ψ(θ) − γ (θ), and type 2 if δ(θ) < 0. I now return to the case with θ = 1
2 for
expositional ￿uidity.
When an investment is wasteful, the impact of contract length is determined by its para-
meters ﬂ ψ and ﬂ γ exactly as for productive investments apart from the level eﬀect implicit in
replacing the factor H by H − 1( H − 2θ in the general case). However, the maximand (3)
only includes the subtraction of the investment cost, since it has no social return. So P and
A aim to minimize the cost, and the message of proposition 4 is exactly inverted. I ￿rst prove
this in proposition 6a by varying the importance (scale), Kj,o faw a s t e f u li n v e s t m e n t ,kj that
costs Kjkj and generates private returns Kj •Bj (kj)w h e r eBj (•)s a t i s ￿es the above regularity
conditions. Then in proposition 6b, I prove the same result holds for increases in the produc-
tivity ￿ Kj of a wasteful investment kj,t h a tc o s t skj and generates private returns of ￿ KjBj (kj).
This second result requires that Bj (•) satisfy assumption 3, because of the countervailing eﬀect
described in proposition 4b above. (Interestingly, assumption 3 is also a suﬃcient condition
25There is one complication. Intermediate breach penalties might allow the non-investing trader to credibly
threaten termination after low cross-investment. Che and Hausch (1999) argue that such option schemes do not
work (given renegotiation), because the trader would threaten to terminate even after high cross-investment.
Ellman (2006) shows that, absent reputational mechanisms, this critique is invalid when options are decided by
a trading decision (see also Watson, 2005). However, option schemes have α<1 in generic stochastic settings,
so there is still a tendency towards shorter contracts.
20for regularity (concavity) of the overall maximization problem.)
Proposition 6a. Optimal contract length is decreasing in the importance of any
wasteful type 1 investment with return function satisfying assumption 1 and reg-
ularity of the overall optimization - assumption 3 is a suﬃcient condition. By
contrast, optimal contract length increases with the importance of wasteful type 2
investments: dα
dKj < 0 if and only if ﬂ δj > 0.
Proposition 6b. If a wasteful investment￿s return function satis￿es assumptions
1 and 3, optimal contract length is decreasing in the investment￿ productivity for
type 1 investments and increasing in productivity for type 2 investments: dα
d ￿ Kj < 0
if and only if ﬂ δj > 0.
When ﬂ ψ>1 (either from negative cross-investment eﬀects or from ψ>1o rb o t h ) ,t h e r e
is a risk of over-investment - for any α> 1−ﬂ γ
ﬂ ψ−ﬂ γ.S o , f o r h i g h α, changing the productivity
(importance) of this investment has the same eﬀect as if the investment were wasteful, while
for low α, the implications are as in proposition 4. Similarly, when ﬂ γ>1, there is a risk of
over-investment for low values of α.26
In conclusion, the impact of cross eﬀects (ψcross and γcross) is the inverse of the correspond-
ing self eﬀects (ψ and γ) and the impact of importance on contract length is inverted for an
investment that is wasteful or excessive. When traders are inexperienced or uncertainty and
complexity are high, it is harder to write contracts that pin down quality, so there is a greater
risk of cross eﬀects. This section helps explain why contracts are often short in such settings:
contract length is reduced to better motivate cross-investments and to reduce over-investment
in investments with negative cross eﬀects. (A complementary eﬀect of uncertainty is to increase
the importance of adaptations. This can also explain the shorter contracts observed.)
5T e m p o r a l E x t e n s i o n
This section analyzes multi-period extensions of the trading model. Stage 3 trading is spread
over time27 and subdivided into N discrete trade decisions, each lasting l units of time. A simple
long-term contract enforcing trade in the ￿rst m ≤ N substages has length L = m•l+G (where
26To complete the generalization, ﬂ ψ and ﬂ γ might also be negative, but this has no special eﬀect other than
possible corner solutions at zero investment.
27Trade is often spread over time because production is time-intensive, being limited by capacity and proce-
dural constraints. Also demands are spread over time (and storage is impossible for services like IT). See 6.1 on
endogenizing trade intensity.
21as de￿ned above, G is the time elapsing between stages 0 and 3). In this section, I analyze
why optimal contracts often take this form and show that the tradeoﬀ from varying L is then
identical to that of varying α in the basic model: Increasing L protects self-investments for
longer, but shields out for longer market forces that protect adaptations.
I maintain the standard assumption that parties can always renegotiate, so I need N
renegotiation stages - one before each trading decision. In the simplest extension, there is only
one investment stage and no history dependence within the extended trading interval, so the
trade payoﬀs in each substage are scalar multiples of the trade payoﬀsf r o mt h eb a s i cm o d e l .
The impact of stage 1 investments may vary with time, so I let the compatibility, generality
and importance parameters depend on n.T h eo v e r a l lg a m ei sa sb e f o r ee x c e p tt h a ts t a g e s2
and 3 are replaced by their N−fold replication and the initial contract determines a probability
αn of trade enforcement via Xn (equivalent to X)i ne a c ho ft h en t r a d es t a g e s .T h ee x t e n d e d
timing is therefore: (Stage 0) P and A negotiate (αn)
N
n=1 and lump-sum transfers; (Stage 1) P
and A invest; [(Stage 2n) Renegotiation over Xn;( S t a g e2 n +1 )n￿th trading decisions]n=N
n=1 .
Given the absence of history-dependence within the subgame starting from stage 2,28 the
continuation payoﬀs equal the sum of the equilibrium payoﬀsf r o mt h eN paired stages (2n
and 2n +1 ) n=N
























j (ij)=1 ( 6 )
In the case of a time invariant technology, the summations in (6) simplify to 1
2H
¡






α; ﬂ ψi,j, ﬂ γi,j
¢
• ￿ Ij,w h e r eα ≡
ΣN
n=1αn
N and ￿ Ej =
PN
n=1 ￿ Ej,n (= N • ￿ Ej,n for each n)a n d
￿ Ij = N • ￿ Ij,n (for all n). So contracts with the same α are equivalent in terms of incentive
eﬃciency. In particular, the simple long-term contract of length L = m • l is de￿ned by
αn =1 {n≤m}, so it is equivalent to α = m
N (= L−G
ﬂ L−G where ﬂ L = N • l is the maximal trade
duration) and I can state,
Proposition 7. In the multi-period extension with time invariance, restricting to
simple long-term contracts has no eﬃciency cost and propositions 1-6 all hold with
L replacing α.
28Renegotiation and interdependence among the αn could create history-dependence inside the subgame, but
the game with independent αn and renegotiation restricted to only adjusting the contract for the upcoming
trading period has the same equilibria.
22Time-invariance is a special case. Allowing for variation in the productivity parameters E
and I over time n permits further predictions. First, if self-investments become redundant over
time and/or adaptation investments become more important over time, simple contracts are
uniquely optimal. The intuition is that simple contracts exploit contractual protection where
most eﬀective and least harmful (in terms of market-shielding), because they crowd trade en-
forcement into the earliest substages where Ej,n is large relative to Ij,n.29 Second, one can study
varying gestation periods, by setting G = 0 and de￿ning Gej = l • max{n : Ej,n =0 ∀m ≤ n}
(and Gij similarly). Two implications are immediate. If contract length L>0, then L should
exceed minj Gej, because otherwise the contract has no protection bene￿t.30 This may help
explain why agriculture contracts are longer in the case of fruit trees as shown in Bandiera￿s
(2002) historical data. However, when Gej gets too large, the market-shielding cost may be
prohibitive and L will fall back, as traders abandon the idea of protecting ej. Further impli-
cations, depend on the time pro￿les of investment productivity and can be analyzed using the
extended model.
A pair of arguably stronger reasons for the prevalence of simple contracts derive from plau-
sible history dependence within the trade interval. Unless a contract is simple, it must involve
at least one ￿performance gap￿ during which the contract does not enforce joint trade. Switch-
ing to an alternative trade during such a gap is often not credible, because the trader would
a n t i c i p a t eh a v i n gt op a y￿xed costs of switching back to joint trade after the gap (in addition to
￿xed costs of switching to the alternative trade).31 This implies market-shielding even during
the contractual gap, so there is no cost from ￿lling in the gap with performance. Even when
switching is credible during a gap (that is long enough to justify the ￿xed costs of switching)
switching to an alternative partner for the main trade can reduce the marginal value of speci￿c
investments when returning to joint trade. For instance, switching may require reorganiza-
tions that interfere with the speci￿c investments. This reduces the eﬀectiveness (investment
protection) of imposing performance after the gap. With these endogenous parameter shifts,
avoiding performance gaps through simple contracts is optimal since it maximizes contract
29The general condition for unique optimality of simple contracts is that the importance of type 1 investments
grow at a lower rate than for type 2￿s - i.e., εn ≡
￿ Ej,n+1
￿ Ej,n <ι n ≡
￿ Ij,n+1
￿ Ij,n ,∀n,∀j. The proof is simple when γ and










n=1 αn￿ Ij,n; ﬂ ψij, ﬂ γij
¢
. Now suppose that αn+1 > 0w h e nαn < 1. Decreasing αn+1 by (any feasible)
η>0a n di n c r e a s i n gαn by ιn •η ￿xes the incentive on all type 2 investments and increases the incentives for all
type 1 investments by (ιn − εn)
η
2δ>0. Hence ￿ αn < 1 ⇒ ￿ αn+1 =0∀n ∈ {1,2,...,N}. Gaps are always avoided.
30If minj Gij > 0 then there is no market-shielding cost for L ∈ [0,minj Gij) so the precise claim is that L
should exceed minj Gej,i fL>minj Gij.
31For side-compatible adaptations, alternative trade credibility is in fact higher during performance
contracting.
23protection relative to market-shielding.32
My model could be extended in two directions. First, I have deferred a general analysis
of settings with switching costs, because intermediate breach penalties can generate a rich
multiplicity of equilibria. In this case, alternative trades become ￿outside options￿ (see Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990)). If one applies the Outside Option Principle as in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993), my results apply unless one trader￿s outside option binds in which case the
other trader gets the full share of renegotiation surplus. If only one trader makes relationship-
speci￿c investments, the tradeoﬀ between protection and market forces is escaped by giving
an attractive breach option to the trader who only makes general investments.
Second, initial investments are often the most important - as with IBM￿s training invest-
ments - however, ongoing investments are also important, especially for adaptations. Intro-
ducing additional investment stages after stage 2 requires ongoing renegotiation in which the
new contract at each stage should be designed to optimize incentives for the upcoming invest-
ment problem. My framework would then predict the length of each new contract, assuming
intertemporal additivity for all investments. Guriev and Kvassov (2006) study precisely this
problem in the case of a single investment, though without the market-shielding problem, and
under the premise that renegotiation is exogenously costly.33
However, I suspect that these predictions are sensitive to the symmetric information as-
sumption. For instance, the long ￿xed term in the IBM-Amex contract was mostly driven by
the need to motivate early investments in reorganization and retraining. Introducing ongo-
ing adaptation investments (or cross-investments), one might have expected renegotiation to
a shorter contract once IBM￿s main transition costs had been sunk. This has not happened
so far and such renegotiations are rare. I suggest two reasons. First, asymmetric information
frustrates such renegotiation. When unable to fully observe IBM￿s training investments, Amex
faces an adverse selection problem, because IBM is more willing to shorten the contract after
weak training investments. Furthermore, renegotiation terms cannot depend fully on IBM￿s
training investments, so IBM￿s incentives would suﬀer greatly. Second, the remaining length of
32I defer a general analysis of settings with switching costs, because intermediate breach penalties can generate
a rich multiplicity of equilibria. Alternative trades become ￿outside options￿ (see Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990)). If one applies the Outside Option Principle as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), my results apply
unless one trader￿s outside option binds in which case the other trader gets the full share of renegotiation surplus.
If only one trader makes relationship-speci￿c investments, the tradeoﬀ between protection and market forces is
escaped by giving an attractive breach option to the trader who only makes general investments.
33They show how contracts specifying a minimum advance notice for termination provide ongoing investment
incentives without need for continuous renegotiation. Adding my market-shielding eﬀect to their problem would
lead to shorter advance notice requirements. Che and S· akovicz (2004) also allow for ongoing investment, but
assume trade can only occur once and focus on an in￿nite time horizon.
24the contract and size of breach penalties fall automatically with time, so adaptation incentives
automatically increase over time.
I conclude this section with a brief comment on measuring contract length. This is non-
trivial when breach is stochastic (as in 6.2). I de￿ned the ￿eﬀective￿ length of a contract as the
amount of time over which a single performance contract would induce trade in the absence
of renegotiation. Through premature breach, this can be lower than the length reported in
the contract (called the ￿nominal￿ length in Aghion and Bolton, 1987). Nonetheless, reported
nominal length (7 years in the case of IBM-Amex) is a good proxy for eﬀective length, because
breach penalties often fall sharply to zero at the end of the reported period.34
6 Applications
This section describes how contractual features (quantity decisions, various types of menu,
contractual restrictions, breach damages and informal enforcement) and trading choices (multi-
sourcing, capacity dedication and selective outsourcing) aﬀect the compatibility parameter ψ
and market-shielding. In particular, the last three subsections analyze the empirical puzzles
from the introduction. My examples remain focused on IT outsourcing and I refer to the Cen-
ter for Organizations Research and Innovation (CORI) for detailed IT outsourcing contracts:
Cobancorp-EDS (1995-2002), UHS-Unisys (1996-2005), GM-EDS (1996-2006), Tri City Bank-
M&I Data Services (1998-2006). However, I also use data on the multi-year contracts in
contract manufacturing, input procurement and franchising.
6.1 Contract Design
Three minor extensions of the basic model greatly increase the realism. First, traders generally
choose among many possible basic trades when writing their initial performance contract. The
traders then optimally choose a contract with which valuable investments are highly compatible
and undesirable investments have zero or low compatibility.35 It is instructive to revisit Edlin
and Reichelstein￿s (1996) model of self-investments in which speci￿c performance contracts
with carefully chosen trade quantity can induce ￿rst-best investment incentives. Introducing
adaptation investments into their model would prevent reaching the ￿rst-best, because raising
trade quantity (or intensity) reduces side-compatibility (see model of the intensity variable
denoted d in section 2 and in 6.4 below). In the multi-period model laid out in section 5, an
34F o re v e r - g r e e nc o n t r a c t s ,t h el e n g t ho ft h ea d v a n c en o t i c ep e r i o di st h ek e yp r o x y ,b u tt h es i z eo ft h ep e n a l t y
on giving notice is particularly important as the eﬀective length is in￿nite if this penalty is too high.
35This statement applies with opposite signs for cross compatibility.
25extremely brief but intense contract could conceivably limit this market-shielding problem, but
there is a major risk that such a contract would simply encourage wasteful investments that
are only useful for producing at arti￿cially high intensity.
Second, the long-term contract might include a trade menu from which at least one party
(usually the client) can choose after investing. For instance, in IBM and Amex￿s ￿pay-as-you-
use￿ contract, Amex owes less to IBM if it uses less server space. This raises side-compatibility
for any Amex adaptation that aﬀects its server space needs. However, ￿exibility must be limited
to protect the seller￿s speci￿c investments. Pricing is generally non-linear. For instance, the
lion￿s share of Amex￿s service charge is eﬀectively ￿xed.36
Third, the contractual menu might be determined over time through a set of modi￿cation
procedures. Indeed, a large share of vendor compensation in the long-term contracts supporting
￿acquisition￿ deals (involving substantial restructuring as in Amex￿IBM) comes in the form
of a ￿revenue commitment￿ that ￿xes a minimal expenditure by the client on the vendor￿s
services (sometimes, as a percentage of the client￿s IT expenditure - see GM￿EDS, 1996).
Revenue commitments give the client the ￿exibility to choose what to buy, but this ￿exibility
is only meaningful when optional items are reasonably priced. Arbitration and benchmarking
procedures are therefore necessary. These procedures work well for minor modi￿cations and
easily priced ￿new releases,￿ but there is a signi￿cant risk that the arbitrator (being imperfectly
informed) speci￿es an excessive price on a non-standard adaptation or additional service. The
vendor and client then engage in bilateral negotiations to ￿nd a mutually agreeable price. So
the credibility of market threats again determines the degree of holdup.37 Any changes that
require negotiation are equivalent to adaptations and my analysis continues to apply.38
C o s t - p l u sc o n t r a c t sc a nb ev i e w e da sam e n uc o n t r a c ti nw h i c ht h e yb u y e rc a nd e m a n d
adaptations on the condition of paying the additional costs required by adaptation. When
containing a minimal trade guarantee, such a contract is very similar to the revenue commit-
ment contract. In ideal circumstances, this again resolves the holdup problems analyzed above.
36Koch (2003) criticizes IBM￿s exaggeration in claiming to have invented a fully ￿exible ￿e-business utility￿
model. Goldberg and Erickson (1987) is a classic reference on non-linearity in long-term contracting.
37Arbitrators may require demonstration of market alternatives when seeking benchmark prices. The credi-
bility of side-trading then aﬀects the benchmarked price ￿xed by this ￿market test.￿ See e.g., additional services
and market tests in GM-EDS￿s $40bn contract.
38Relatedly, some contracts ￿x an annual limit on ￿system enhancements￿ that the client can demand at a
predetermined total price, but again the arbitrator￿s ignorance may lead to over-estimates of the work hours
required for a given enhancement. Flexibility is further limited when the client exceeds the ￿total work hours￿
as occurred to the UK Inland Revenue￿Accenture contract after legislators introduced ￿stakeholder pensions￿
in 1998 and quarterly tax reporting for corporations in 1999 (see NAO, 2001).
26However, the problem is as before: measuring adaptation costs is often too diﬃcult.39
6.2 Contract Enforcement and Breach Damages
As just noted, the principal contract enforcement problem underlying my main result is the
non-veri￿ability of adaptation costs. Since veri￿ability is also a problem for informal enforce-
ment mechanisms involving third parties, my results continue to apply in settings where trade
agreements are enforced by group or market reputations. However, if the trading relationship
were governed by bilateral self-enforcement (also called relational contracting), these informa-
tional constraints would be avoided. Unfortunately, in settings where large speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t s
are sunk at the start of the relationship and pay oﬀ over a period of many years, repetition
within the same relationship is unlikely. So self-enforcement of these investments is not usually
feasible. By contrast, adaptation investments and returns are often more frequently repeated,
so reputational mechanisms should favour longer contracts.40
My sharp non-veri￿ability assumptions also ruled out more subtle breach penalties such
as reliance and expectation damage measures as alternatives to liquidated damages. Relaxing
these assumptions reduces the diﬃculty of motivating investments, but with imperfect measure-
ment of the potential costs and bene￿ts from adaptation, market forces and side-compatibility
still matter. Even without relaxing the assumptions, there is one further issue: the optimal
contract design may involve intermediate liquidated damages.
In section 4, I explained how intermediate damages enable option contracts to induce
breach threats after low cross-investment. I now show how intermediate damages can make
breach credibility contingent on the stochastic value of adaptation investments. For instance,
after Halifax acquired the Bank of Scotland (BoS) in 2002, its gain from substituting BoS￿s
centralized IT infrastructure with a more decentralized system exceeded the breach damages
in BoS￿s outsourcing contracts with IBM and Xansa (see Computer Weekly, 2002). So the
acquisition induced breach and the marginal returns on acquisition investments were high, be-
cause the breach penalty was fairly low. In terms of the model, the moderate breach penalties
39My strict assumption that costs are non-veri￿able rules out cost-plus contracting, but in settings where
many similar traders could gain from long-term contracting and good incentives to adapt, the traders might
pay to create a specialist agency that would build a capability and reputation for verifying adaptation costs.
In these settings, contracts could be longer without suﬀering from serious rigidities. (Of course, if the agency
could also verify investments, long-term contracts would not be needed either.)
40Speci￿c assumptions about renegotiation are also important. For instance, they determine whether long-
term contracts can credibly increase mutual punishment in support of self-enforcement. (For evidence that
formality does not imply deep distrust, notice that the litigation between Xerox and EDS did not prevent them
from later extending their trading relationship ￿ DiSabatino, 2001).
27raised side-compatibility without an excessive fall in protection of self-investments. In gen-
eral, it is optimal to make breach credible in states where the marginal returns to adaptation
investments are maximal, thereby exploiting market forces at their most powerful. Interme-
diate breach damages therefore dominate stochastic enforcement with high breach penalties,
whenever the marginal and absolute returns on adaptations are positively correlated.41
6.3 Multiple Vendors
In 2003, Procter and Gamble (P&G) decided against putting all its eggs in one basket, by
outsourcing its IT to three key vendors: Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Jones, Lang & Lasalle ￿
see Weiss and Perez (2003). A stylized analysis of this decision clari￿es the ￿exibility advantage
of the multi-vendor approach; see Currie (1998) for two related case studies. Each vendor had
to sink ￿xed costs in learning about P&G. Had P&G instead outsourced to EDS in a one-stop
contract, as initially planned, EDS would have reaped economies of scope by sinking one set,
i n s t e a do ft h r e es e t s ,o f￿xed learning costs. However, in addition to minor specialization
gains, P&G bene￿ts from the multiple sunk costs, because these three vendors create credible
competition for many of the service adaptations that P&G may later discover (see model
below). This increased competition allows P&G to negotiate adaptations more cheaply and
more reliably.
L· opez and Ventura (2001) and Gonz· alez and L· opez (2002) analyze outsourcing contracts
in the electronics industry using primary source data from ANIEL.42 Their survey reports how
many subcontractors are used by each manufacturer as well as the estimated length of writ-
ten contracts. Having multiple subcontractors, or vendors, is a good proxy for the existence
of competing providers. So, based on Joskow (1987) (see section 3 above), they expected a
negative correlation with contract length. Instead, they found an insigni￿cant positive corre-
lation. I claim that the concept of side-compatibility can resolve this puzzle;43 Multi-sourcing
increases side-compatibility and proposition 5 shows that optimal contract length should there-
fore increase. This counteracts the pressure to make contracts shorter. So it could explain the
41Of course, where possible, breach damages are directly contingent on events ￿ e.g., mergers and acquisitions
￿ where adaptations tend to be important. Similarly, because adaptations often become increasingly important
over time, breach damages usually fall gradually over the duration of a contract.
42Asociaci· on Nacional de Industrias Electr· onicas y de Telecomunicaciones. Electronics outsourcing is a global
phenonomenon: e.g., huge 3-year deals between IBM and Sanmina-SCI in 2002 and 2003, and Casio and
Flextronics in 2002, and 5-year deals between HP and Solectron in 2003 and Avaya and Celestica in 2001.
43Errors in measurement and coding (of contract length) could also explain the insigni￿cance, so further
empirics is needed. For richer but sparser data with the same positive correlation, see Beulen and Ribbers￿
(2003) IT outsourcing case studies.
28empirical result, but to be thorough, I need to endogenize the sourcing decision. I do so now
for a single buyer with two potential sellers.
I build on the simple technological setup described in the italicized derivation of side-
compatibility from section 2: I allow for exogenous variation in the size of the ￿xed startup
costs and in the investment importance parameters, I and E. Each of the two potential
suppliers faces the same ￿xed cost F of servicing the buyer￿s speci￿c needs. So dual sourcing
wastes a possible scope economy worth F. This may be partially compensated by specialization
gains, S. So the technological advantage of single sourcing is F −S.44 Now for single sourcing,
the supplier that is not selected in advance can still avoid sinking its ￿x e dc o s tw h e na na d a p t e d
service is discovered, so given F>γ W(e), this supplier will not credibly compete for providing
the adapted service and ψ =0<γ .45
By contrast, under dual sourcing, the ￿xed costs of each supplier have already been sunk,
so each supplier oﬀers credible competition against the other. By construction, adaptation by
the optimal supplier generates W (e). To allow for gains from learning, I suppose the other
provider generates γ0W (e)w i t hγ0 ≥ γ. If the buyer runs a sourcing auction, side-compatibility
ψdual is then equal to γ0. The buyer￿s default adaptation returns are just as high as when the
dual source contracts expire, since γdual = γ0 too. So the adaptation cost from long-term
contracting is now zero (−δdual = γdual − ψdual = 0) and more generally is much lower than
under single sourcing.46
So proposition 5 predicts that exogenously imposing dual sourcing will raise contract length.
I now endogenize the sourcing decision. Up-front transfers (determined in the ex ante com-
petition among suppliers) imply that the buyer chooses the sourcing strategy that maximises
total surplus. So I simply compare the surpluses under dual and single sourcing. Dual sourcing
wastes F − S relative to single sourcing, but raises the equilibrium level of adaptation invest-
ments by an amount ∆e.S i n c e ∆e is increasing in contract length α,47 I analyze the joint
choice of sourcing and length.
Ib e g i nw i t ht h es i m p l ec a s ew h e r eF or S varies for some exogenous technological reason.
An increase in F −S directly raises the probability of single sourcing and therefore (by reduc-
ing side-compatibility) lowers the expected contract length α. Variation in F − S therefore
44Positive F − S is trivial: dual sourcing is then technologically and strategically (for investment incentives)
optimal.
45This neglects the possibility of multiple trade technologies, but the analysis readily generalizes since the
￿xed cost sunk under dual sourcing generally induces a more eﬃcient side-trading technology.
46Economies of scope in variable costs would imply γdual >ψ dual, but −δ is still generally greater under single
sourcing, because the added problem of the ￿xed costs is greater relative to an isolated side trade.
47Dual sourcing could reduce speci￿city of speci￿c investments where speci￿city is caused by ￿xed costs. Such
an eﬀect would only reinforce the empirical puzzle.
29generates a negative correlation between single sourcing and contract length, oﬀering a clear
and simple resolution of the empirical puzzle.
Now I analyze the case where variations in sourcing strategies are driven by variations in
the importance (I and E) of adaptation and speci￿c investments. Consider increasing the
importance E of speci￿c investments. By proposition 4a, it is optimal to raise contract length
α, but when the distortion in adaptation incentives gets high enough (I not too small), it
becomes optimal to shift to dual sourcing. Dual sourcing favours adaptation investments, so
this shift is accompanied by an upwards jump in α. Further increases in E again lead to further
increases in α. It follows immediately that dual sourcing is associated with longer contracts
(greater α).
Variations in the importance of adaptation investments have a less monotonic eﬀect. When
I is very low, it is optimal to focus on protecting speci￿c investments with a long-term contract
and dual-sourcing is suboptimal (in the non-trivial case where F − S>0). As I rises, α
should fall, except at the point (for large enough E)w h e r eI is large enough to justify a
shift to dual sourcing. At this point, α jumps upwards, before continuing to fall with I.T h e
comparison between the average contract lengths associated with dual and single sourcing
therefore depends on the exact density distribution of I. So the prediction here is ambiguous.
My principal contribution is to show that dual sourcing can (and often but not always, will)
favour long-term contracting and to identify conditions favouring this outcome.
To extend the relevance of this section to applied work, it is also important to recognize
that the side-compatibility advantage of multi-sourcing can sometimes be achieved through
￿selective outsourcing,￿ whereby a client retains a strong internal IT unit. Indeed, Amex
chose this approach. Its internal IT unit credibly competes with IBM to satisfy some of its
adaptation needs, so Amex￿s side-compatibility is not so low. See Lacity et al., (1996) for
evidence suggesting that selective outsourcing, like multi-sourcing, increases ￿exibility.
6.4 Multiple Clients and Dedication
Transaction cost theorists have thoroughly analyzed the contracts between coal processors and
electric utilities. Expanding on Joskow￿s (1987) classic approach, Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001)
measured the fraction of capacity each coal company dedicates to the contract for supplying
coal with its utility partner. They were surprised to ￿nd a signi￿cant negative correlation
between this measure of dedication and contract length. This ￿nding (which is robust to four
explanation attempts performed by Kerkvliet and Shogren, 2001) is indeed anomalous given
that high dedication plausibly proxies for relationship-speci￿city which tends to require longer
contracts.
30The side-compatibility perspective oﬀers a simple explanation.48 High dedication to a
speci￿c contract leaves the vendor with less capacity to exploit its adaptations in side-trading,
so side-compatibility is low and this induces shorter contracts (proposition 5). To complete
this explanation, I consider three ways to endogenize the level of dedication. First, as noted in
6.1, increasing a coal company￿s supply commitment eventually induces wasteful investments in
capability to satisfy the commitment. An exogenous increase in the distortionary eﬀect of such
commitments (e.g., increased diﬃculty in predicting output) encourage reduced commitment,
so the fraction of available capacity dedicated to a contract (d) falls. This increases side-
compatibility as explained in section 2 and therefore facilitates an increase in α.A c c o r d i n g l y
α and d are negatively correlated, as claimed. Second, if side-trading involves ￿xed costs and
becomes untenable for d above a cut-oﬀ level ￿ d, exogenous reductions in ￿ d lead to reductions in d
(assuming adaptations and self-investments are both important). To maintain self-investments,
α can and should then be raised to compensate for the fall in d. So exogenous shifts in ￿ d can also
explain the negative correlation. A third argument follows from the section 5 observation that
when adaptation values increase rapidly over time, it is better to use short, but high intensity
(dedicated) contracts. So variation in the rate of technical change or supply uncertainty could
similarly generate a negative correlation between length and dedication.49
6.5 Contractual Restrictions
In my basic model, long-term contracts impose trade obligations without shifting residual
control rights, but rights and restrictions are sometimes needed to complement performance
contracts. For instance, exclusive territory clauses in a franchise contract (that prevents holdup
through increases in the royalty rate) prevent franchisors from holding up franchisees by setting
up new units that would compete nearby. As complementary tools for protecting speci￿ci n v e s t -
ments by franchisees, exclusive territories and contract length should be correlated. Bercovitz
(2000) tests for a positive correlation (her fourth hypothesis, H4) in her rich franchising data
48An alternative is to argue that contract dedication may proxy for coal vendors that have only one client
and therefore (having only paid one set of client-speci￿c ￿xed costs) have relatively low side-compatibility.
By analogy with multi-sourcing, exogenous variation in client-speci￿c ￿xed costs or the importance of speci￿c
investments could explain a positive correlation between contract length and selling to multiple clients. (I
focus on the simpler explanation in the text, since Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001) measure dedication relative to
available capacity, subtracting prior contractual commitments, so a follow-up study might well ￿nd that high
dedication is not a good proxy for having only one client in their dataset.)
49Also, uncertainty in electricity demand is greater over longer time horizons, so risk averse utilities may
prefer to buy coal in shorter term contracts as a way to share demand risk with coal producers. Again, contract
dedication would covary negatively to counterbalance length reductions.
31s e t . T h ep u z z l ei st h a ts h e￿nds no signi￿cant correlation. The side-compatibility perspec-
tive oﬀers a simple resolution. Exclusivity clauses reduce the side-compatibility of franchisor
investments that require local adaptations, and this makes contract length more costly. Fran-
chise contracts do not always need exclusivity to complement them and (by proposition 5)
contracts will be longer in these cases. For instance, in low density markets, the franchisor
cannot credibly threaten to hold up the franchisee by setting up a new franchise or company
unit nearby, so exclusive territories are not needed. Holdup is adequately prevented by the
long-term franchise contract ￿xing royalty rate and fees. However, in denser local markets,
exclusivity territories are needed to complement the long-term contract; incentives for fran-
chisor adaptations are then at risk and contracts should be shorter.50 This oﬀers a reasonable
explanation for the negative correlation.
Interestingly, Bercovitz (2000) also ￿nds an insigni￿cant correlation between exclusivity
and her proxy for speci￿city (franchisor estimates of franchisee set-up costs). Measurement
error might explain the insigni￿cant correlation, but the proxy speci￿city has been successful
in other work ￿ see Dnes (1992) and Brickley et al., (2003) (which, as mentioned above, con-
tains strong results supporting proposition 4a). Instead, I oﬀer an explanation based on side-
compatibility and the section 5 idea that adaptation investments become more productive over
time. When speci￿city is low, contracts can be short and exclusivity is a sensible complement
to the contract, since each party can earn a reasonable return on its adaptation investments
by waiting till the contract expires. Exclusivity is problematic, however, when speci￿city is
important enough to require longer contracts. This countervails against Bercovitz￿s prediction
that exclusivity would be more common where speci￿c investments are more signi￿cant.51
Contracts regularly seek the very opposite of exclusivity restrictions, by specifying rights
to solicit competitive bids on services beyond the baseline contract.52 Additionally, IT con-
t r a c t sa n di n d u s t r yn o r m so f t e nr e q u i r es t a n d a r d i z a t i o na n dd o c u m e n t a t i o no fc o d e ,e v e n
pressuring providers to cooperate.53 Further work could extend my model of contracting and
50Kaufmann￿s (1993) Harvard Business case study oﬀers a concrete example of an adaptation problem: Pizza
Hut￿s eﬀorts to develop and implement a Pepsi promotion scheme through home deliveries were frustrated when
Pizza Hut had to negotiate with franchisees who preferred to focus on eat-in dining.
51Future empirical work that identi￿es an exogenous source of variation in the use of exclusivity clauses would
oﬀer an excellent way to test my theory more directly. Variation in the legality of exclusivity restrictions across
U.S. states presents a promising avenue, but restrictive states also tend to restrict contract termination making
reported contract length a biased proxy of contract length.
52This was common in Goldberg and Erickson￿s (1987) data on coke supply contracts. It is also very common
in IT contracting.
53E.g., clause 3.05 in UHS-Unisys obliges Unisys to support third-party software purchased by UHS. Enforce-
ment, however, is diﬃcult ￿ Lacity and Willcocks (1998) report two cases where vendors prevented third-party
32side-compatibility to analyze how to assign ownership rights when some investments are partly
asset-speci￿c.
7 Concluding Discussion
I have analyzed the optimal duration of performance contracting in a bilateral model where
both traders make multiple investments. My most important result is that contracts should be
shorter when side-compatibility is low and it is important to motivate adaptation investments.
By showing that side-compatibility is high in three relevant settings (when a trader has multiple
vendors, when long-term contracts do not exhaust the capacity or need for trade, and when
there are no exclusivity clauses restricting side-trades), I was able to apply this result to predict
a pressure towards longer contracts and resolve the three empirical puzzles from the transaction
cost literature.
My market-shielding perspective endogenizes and quali￿es the transaction cost idea that
long-term contracts have ￿exibility costs. Formally, I have shown that (unless fully side-
compatible) adaptations can be more cheaply implemented under short-term than long-term
contracting. My framework also indicates why renegotiating from a long-term contract is likely
to be harder than negotiating from scratch:54 competitive bids can reveal information about the
cost of adaptations, reducing information asymmetries and with them, the risk of negotiation
failure, so long-term contracts that reduce competition (because of limited side-compatibility)
increase the risk of failing to negotiate eﬃcient adaptations ex post.55
Because of a false presumption that general investments are not at risk of holdup, other
formal analyses have neglected how long-term contracts interfere with valuable market forces.
Most papers with long-term contracting simply ignored general investments. MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) is an exception, but they only studied one joint trade, thereby precluding
the possibility of general investments that require an adapted joint trade. The closest analogy
to my market-shielding result is in fact Hart and Moore￿s (1990) analysis of ownership. In a
setting without long-term contracting, they showed how removing ownership rights interferes
with access to market forces that could otherwise motivate asset-speci￿c investments. In a
setting with long-term contracts, I have shown how a contractual trading obligation shields
out market forces that could otherwise motivate adaptation investments.
supply by claiming interference with their maintenance obligations. Standards are perhaps more important for
reducing transition costs than side-compatibility ￿ see Beulen and Ribbers (2003).
54Many theorists have assumed there is no diﬀerence, positing instead an exogenous cost of renegotiation (see
e.g., Harris and Holmstr¤ om, 1987, and Guriev and Kvassov, 2006).
55Future work must extend the model to include alternative traders who invest and bid to win new trades.
33My results formally corroborate prior insights from transaction cost theory on the impact
of market-thickness, investment speci￿city, contract eﬀectiveness and uncertainty, and novel
results, such as the distinction between the level and substitution eﬀects of changes on contract
length and their dependence on the type of investment. Because the model is very tractable
(for instance, cross eﬀects and wasteful investments have the exact inverse impact of the
corresponding self eﬀects and non-wasteful investments), it is also easy to analyze temporal
variation in investment productivity and future work can extend my multi-period setting to
allow for richer history-dependence.
In the extensions section, I explained how intermediate breach penalties and menu contracts
can raise contractual ￿exibility. Relational contracting may further enhance the eﬀectiveness
of menu contracts, so building on the modeling approach of Baker et al., (2002) presents
important work for future analysis. Extending the model to allow for partially measurable
costs is also interesting: Bajari and Tadelis (2001) argue that cost-plus contracts are more
￿exible than ￿xed-price contracts because renegotiation is then more eﬃcient. Since Bajari
and Tadelis (2001) do not consider market forces, combining our models could generate novel
predictions. For instance, I conjecture that settings with high side-compatibility will favor
￿xed-price contracting, since these settings limit the in￿exibility concern.
In conclusion, the resolution of the three puzzles and the consistency with the evidence
from the transaction cost literature on contract length oﬀers encouraging support for my simple
model. Nonetheless, it is vital to now collect empirical data with an eye to creating eﬀective
proxies of side-compatibility and the other parameters used to predict contract length. This
will permit sharper tests of the model￿s predictions and improve our ability to explain the
design and duration of contracts.
34Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Diﬀerentiating the identities in (2) with respect to α and de￿ning










































The bracketed expressions are positive by Assumption 1. H is always positive by Assumption
2. The sign of δ is positive for eP and eA and negative for iP and iA,b yt y p e1a n d2d e ￿nitions.
This proves 3(a).





























Both these expressions are positive for α ∈ (0,1). The ￿rst is positive even when α =0 ,t h e
second is positive even when α = 1. This proves 3(b) since the exact same expressions and
observations are valid for ij. 3(c) follows from the observations that ej (1) = eLTC
j ≤ e∗
j and
ij (0) = iSTC
j ≤ i∗
j -c o m p a r e￿rst order conditions (2) at α =1a n d0w i t h￿rst-best conditions
(1).




























































































































































































































2−H for all α.S i n c e
H ∈ [1,2], 6−2H






is clearly suﬃcient. The term from
dDij
dα is also
positive under the parallel condition, because while δij and i0
j are both negative, their product
is still positive. This proves that dD
dα < 0 for 4a.
Suﬃciency for the maximand in 4b follows immediately, because setting E and I to unity












P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 a . The ￿rst-order condition for the optimization problem (4a) is
D(E,I;α(E,I)) = 0, for D as de￿ned in (A2). This holds for all E and I, so applying the






























36which is positive since 0 <H<2a n de0
j (α) > 0. Hence dα








< 0s i n c ei0
j (α) < 0.






























j (ej, ￿ Ej) =
−2δej
￿ EjH2W00
j (ej(α, ￿ Ej)) (and



















































































































































which is positive by
assumption 3. Hence, ∂D
∂ ￿ Ej > 0s o( A 2 )r e v e a l st h a t dα
d ￿ Ej > 0 as claimed. Again dα
dIj takes the
opposite sign since δij < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Ip r o v ef o rt h ec a s eo fej (same arguments hold for ij). To study
changes in δ with H ￿xed at H = ￿ H for α =￿ α,d i ﬀerentiating D at α =￿ α simply gives:
∂D














> 0( a s ￿ Hej < 2a n dW00 < 0). Applying the
Implicit Function Theorem to the ￿rst-order condition (D(ψ,γ;α(ψ,γ)) ≡ 0) gives,
∂α
∂δej
|Hej(￿ α)= ￿ Hej = −
∂D




∂α < 0, this substitution eﬀect is positive at α =￿ α,s oα increases as claimed.
37Similarly, the Implicit Function Theorem gives the level eﬀect of changing Hej with δej
















and Dej depends on α through Hej.N o w
∂Dej
∂α < 0, so this level eﬀect has
the same sign as −￿ δej. The same argument applies for ij.
















≡ 2. So diﬀerentiating with



















, so I can guarantee that the optimand￿s concavity increases (i.e., ∂D






j (kj(α, ￿ Kj))
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So, a suﬃcient (often far from necessary condition) for regularity of the optimization problem















which has the same sign as −δkj.
Similarly, dα






























































































in the second simpli￿cation here.) Assumption 3 on Bj implies that
38this takes the same sign as −δkj.S oα increases with ￿ Kj for type 2 investments and decreases
with ￿ Kj for type 1 investments.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . Given the optimality of joint trade (under Z)i ne a c hs u b p e r i o d ,






























which is equivalent to (4b) given that ￿ Ej =
PN
n=1 ￿ Ej,n and ￿ Ij =
PN









(derived in the text) are identical to those (equa-
tion 5) applying to proposition 4b. So P and A￿s problem is equivalent to that in proposition
4b. Setting ￿ Ej = ￿ Ij = 1 replicates the basic optimization problem from which propositions
1-6 were derived. Furthermore, those results hold for the tradeoﬀ in L since variation in L is
equivalent to variation in α.
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